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Abstract: Canadian environmental law has changed dramatically over the last 50 years, 
responding to some of the flaws and weaknesses identified by commentators seeking to 
explain the continuing trend in environmental degradation. The aim of this article is to tell 
the story of three pieces of Canadian environmental legislation, the Alberta Land 
Stewardship Act, the federal Species at Risk Act, and Alberta’s Environmental Protection 
and Enhancement Act, with a view to exploring whether the environmental ambition 
underlying these pieces of legislation is being realized. Our overall conclusion is that there 
is a significant gap between the ambition of these three pieces of environmental legislation 
and their actual implementation but this gap arises from design choices made by the 
legislature and the executive, rather than something inherent in the law itself. 
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1. Introduction 
The call for papers for this special issue asked to what extent the law, as an integral constituent of 
environmental law, may be responsible for the latter’s failure to prevent environmental degradation [1,2]. 
In other words, is there something inherent about the law, that “particular family of human social 
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arrangements, consisting of public and officially sanctioned norms defining both acceptable and 
unacceptable modes of individual and group behavior” [3], or about the subject (the environment) 
that makes it particularly problematic to enact and enforce a set of norms that will prevent 
environmental degradation. 
This is clearly a very large topic that is far beyond the compass of any particular contribution to this 
volume. Accordingly, we have set ourselves a much narrower objective in this contribution. We begin 
with the idea that the face of environmental law in North America generally and Canada in particular 
has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Fifty years ago environmental law (if it could be 
called that) was primarily the domain of the common law (i.e., actions in nuisance, trespass, 
negligence), where changes to doctrine “are so gradual that their significance is at first obscured” [4]. 
The inability of common law causes of action to keep up with growing public expectations drove the 
creation of the modern environmental state in the early 1970s [5]. In the U.S., what is now referred to as 
the “environmental decade” [6] saw the passage of all of that country’s major environmental laws, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act [7], the Clean Air Act [8], and the Clean Water Act [9]. 
In Canada, the 1969 Throne Speech foreshadowed the passage of five new environmental statutes, 
including a Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Environmental Contaminants Act and Ocean Dumping 
Control Act (most of these eventually consolidated in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act [10]). 
What is now known as Environment Canada was created in 1971, and in 1977 the federal Fisheries Act 
was transformed into a relatively powerful environmental statute with the introduction of the habitat 
protection and pollution prevention provisions [11]. 
However, the continuing trend of environmental degradation suggested that this was not enough. 
Both scholars and practitioners began to identify numerous flaws and weaknesses in these new 
environmental regimes [5,6,12]. In Canada, these included excessively discretionary executive 
powers [13], sectoral as opposed to ecosystem approaches [14], the failure to adopt precautionary 
approaches [14] (pp. 64–65), lack of enforcement [13] (p. 234), limited (or non-existent) 
opportunities for public participation [5] (pp. 234–238) and the preoccupation of many rules with 
major harms to the neglect of cumulative impacts [15]. 
The federal and provincial governments in Canada have responded to at least some of these 
criticisms and we discuss three examples here. The first example is the Alberta Land Stewardship Act 
(ALSA) [16]. This ambitious legislation was designed to establish a framework for regional planning as 
a means of addressing the problem of cumulative impacts by engaging in planning at a landscape level 
and establishing thresholds designed to protect ecological health and integrity. The second example is 
the federal Species At Risk Act (SARA) [17], which is Canada’s endangered species statute. This 
equally ambitious statute is designed to protect Canada’s biological diversity through a series of 
action-forcing provisions intended to protect species and their habitats. The third statute is Alberta’s 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act (EPEA) [18] which was designed to bring together a 
number of sector specific statutes (e.g., air and water pollution statutes) under a single umbrella and is 
based on the recognition that “the protection of the environment is essential to the integrity of 
ecosystems and human health and to the well-being of society”. One of the procedural innovations of 
this statute was the creation of an Environmental Appeals Board to provide an opportunity for closer 
examination of more important and contentious environmental approvals. 
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Our aim is to see if there is still a gap between the ambition of these statutes and their actual 
implementation and, if so, to examine the reasons for that gap. We have chosen to examine these three 
statutes for several reasons. Both ALSA and SARA are relatively recent statutes and therefore speak to 
the law’s potential for change and improvement. All three regimes, but perhaps especially ALSA, were 
heralded when introduced as bold and innovative statutes that would drive positive environmental 
outcomes. We chose the EPEA and the EAB that it created to reflect on the role that process and 
institutions play in determining the effectiveness of environmental regimes. 
Our overall conclusion is that there remains a significant gap between ambition and 
implementation. The reasons for this are no doubt complex but our more specific conclusions for each 
of the three regimes are as follows. Although still early in its implementation, ALSA’s ambition is 
dependent on the executive’s exercise of excessively discretionary powers. SARA’s goals, on the other 
hand, have been thwarted not by excessively discretionary powers but rather by the government’s 
refusal to adhere to the applicable statutory rules established by the statute for the recovery of species. 
Furthermore, the goals of the environmental appeal process in EPEA have been limited by narrow 
standing rules that have failed to keep up with developments in the general law. A common theme for 
all three regimes is the important role that the executive plays in explaining the implementation gap in 
environmental statutes. The problem in implementation may not be so much a problem with the law as 
it is a problem of the absence of political will to achieve the lofty goals of these important statutes. Our 
discussion also shows that while the courts can play a facilitative role in helping environmental 
statutes fulfill their “promise” [19], it will be much more difficult for them to play a constructive role 
in the face of broad discretionary powers (as is the case under ALSA) and statutory standing tests 
which insulate statutory regimes from broader developments in the common law (as under EPEA). 
2. The Alberta Land Stewardship Act  
ALSA has the potential to be one of the most significant pieces of environmental legislation adopted 
within Alberta in the last couple of decades [20]. Promoted by the Government of Alberta as “the most 
comprehensive land-use policy in Canada and, indeed, in North America” [21], ALSA provides for 
landscape level land-use planning as a means to integrate decision-making and respond to the 
cumulative effects of development activity. In so doing, ALSA recognizes that there are limits to the 
trade-offs a functioning ecosystem can be asked to make to reap economic benefits. One of the goals 
of ALSA, therefore, is to provide a means to plan for the needs of current and future generations and to 
enable sustainable development, by taking account of and responding to the cumulative effects of 
human endeavor [16] (Sections 1(2)(b),(d)). ALSA’s environmental goals are laudable in any 
jurisdiction. In Alberta, where the economy is driven in large part by oil, gas, and oil sands production 
and the landscape is also significantly impacted by activities such as agriculture and commercial 
forestry, the challenges are evident.  
If ALSA successfully achieves its environmental goals, the legislation will serve as an example of a 
pro-active, ecosystem based environmental law focused on the management of cumulative impacts. 
However, many of the weaknesses identified in the environmental law literature referred to in the 
introduction remain embedded in ALSA—most notably excessively discretionary executive 
powers—with the potential to undermine the implementation of this innovative legislation. Whether 
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this weakness will result in a gap between ALSA’s ambition and its ultimate implementation remains 
an outstanding question. However, it is possible to begin to answer this question by considering the 
experience with its implementation so far. 
2.1. Brief Overview of the Policy Background 
Following three years of stakeholder and public consultation, in 2008 the Government of Alberta 
committed to a new land use policy—the Land-use Framework [22]. A central theme in the 
Framework is the need to move from project-by-project approval processes to more formalized 
regional-level planning. To this end, the Framework states that the Government of Alberta will 
develop land-use plans on a specified timetable for seven identified regions, defined by the major 
watersheds in the province [22] (pp. 19,24), to direct regional decision-making. Accordingly, the 
Framework provides that each regional plan will define economic, environmental and social outcomes 
specific to the region and establish a broad plan for both private and public lands and natural resource 
use within the region [22] (p. 26). A key strategy in the Framework is a commitment to the use of 
cumulative effects management at the regional level, subject to the caveat that the emerging practice of 
cumulative effects management is an “art not a science” and should be used “pragmatically not 
dogmatically” [22] (p. 31). In keeping with this commitment, the Framework provides that limits will 
be established for the cumulative effects that economic development has on the air, land, water and 
biodiversity within the region. 
2.2. ALSA as Discretionary Legislation 
ALSA translates the Framework’s foundational strategies into law. However, the legislative 
translation is steeped in unconstrained discretion. For example, the creation of both land-use regions 
and regional land-use plans is completely discretionary and the legislation does not incorporate the 
timelines included in the Framework [16] (Sections 3(1),4(1)). When a regional plan is created, ALSA 
leaves it to the discretion of Cabinet to set the terms of reference, to describe the required level of 
public and stakeholder consultation, and to prescribe the consideration to be accorded to economic, 
environmental and social issues [16] (Sections 51(a)–(d) and (g)–(h)). Additionally, while an approved 
plan is binding on the Crown, local government bodies, decision-makers and all other persons [16] 
(Section 115(1)), discretionary powers are available to exempt decision-makers [16] (Section 66) or 
grant variances to private interest holders [16] (Section 15.1(2)). Action in the courts to enforce  
non-compliance with ALSA or a regional plan is reserved to the stewardship commissioner [16] 
(Sections 15(3),(5) and 18(1)), with public complaints left to a discretionary investigation and 
reporting process [16] (Section 62). 
Perhaps most notably, ALSA leaves a regional plan’s content largely to Cabinet 
discretion—requiring only that the plan describe the vision for the planning region and state one or 
more objectives [16] (Sections 8(1) and 13(1)). Significantly, elements essential to a cumulative 
effects management approach—such as thresholds, indicators and details relating to the monitoring and 
assessment of these thresholds, indicators and policies—are all left to the discretion of the  
Cabinet [16] (Section 8(2)). Also discretionary is inclusion of actions or measures to be taken if adverse 
trends or effects eventuate, thresholds are exceeded, or objectives or policies are not being  
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maintained [16] (Section 15(2)(d)–(f)). Ultimately, a regional plan “may” contain provisions that the 
Cabinet considers necessary or appropriate to advance or implement the purposes of the Act [16]  
(Section 9(1)). As a result, the implementation of a cumulative effects management approach within 
any given regional plan is dependent on the exercise of executive discretion. With limited exceptions for 
a “person who is directly or adversely affected by a regional plan to request a review [16] (Section 19.2), 
no opportunity exists for interested parties to compel the exercise of this discretion to ensure ALSA’s 
environmental aspirations will be attained. 
2.3. Implementation of ALSA  
The question then is whether the unconstrained discretionary powers of the legislation create an 
implementation gap between ALSA’s ambition and the resulting plans. So far, from a process 
perspective, it is possible to suggest that the “fears associated with such broad discretionary authority 
appear to be overstated” [23]. Although well behind the timelines contemplated in the Framework, the 
regional planning process is underway in the two regions identified as first priorities. The plan for the 
first of these priority areas, the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan (“LARP”), took effect on September 1 
2012 [24] and the South Saskatchewan Regional Plan (SSRP) has recently been approved. However, the 
creation of regional plans does not, in and of itself, mean that the environmental goals of ALSA will be 
delivered. Indeed, the experience gained so far with the LARP suggests that a gap in ambition remains. 
In keeping with the aspirations of the Framework and goals of ALSA, the vision for the Lower 
Athabasca Region is one in which “the region’s diverse economic opportunities are balanced with social 
and environmental considerations using a cumulative effects management approach” [24] (p. 23). 
Perhaps optimistically, the LARP’s vision seeks to optimize the economic potential of the region’s oil 
sands resource—currently estimated at 169 billion barrels of recoverable oil sands—and diversify the 
regional economy while also managing landscapes to maintain ecosystem function and biodiversity 
and managing air and water to support human and ecosystem needs [24] (p. 23). Underlying this vision 
is the cumulative effects management approach. 
The cumulative effects management approach is operationalized in the LARP through a series of 
management frameworks which set triggers, intended to provoke a proactive response when exceeded, 
and limits, designed to set clear system based boundaries that are not to be exceeded [24] (p. 27). To 
this end, an Air Quality Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca Region [25] and a Surface 
Water Quality Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca Region [26] have been approved, 
setting air and surface water quality triggers and limits. A Groundwater Management Framework for 
the Lower Athabasca Region is also in place, although providing only interim triggers for regional 
groundwater quality and a process to develop final triggers and limits [24] (p. 27). In addition, the 
LARP commits to updating an existing Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the 
Lower Athabasca River, with stakeholders expecting “that when the water management framework is 
updated it will include a legally binding Ecological Base Flow (EBF), below which water withdrawals 
will be prohibited” [27]. 
To the extent that these management frameworks identify and manage regional cumulative effects, 
they signal an important shift towards a cumulative effects management approach in the Lower 
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Athabasca Region. They thus suggest that the otherwise unconstrained discretion afforded the 
Executive in ALSA has been exercised in a manner consistent with the Framework. 
However, the shift to a cumulative effects management approach in the Lower Athabasca Region is 
far from complete. This is so for several reasons. First, the existing management frameworks are not 
comprehensive. For example, the triggers and limits in the Air Quality Management Plan apply only to 
NO2 and SO2, without reference to other air quality components while those within the Surface Water 
Quality Management Framework apply to only one water body [24] (p. 51). Additionally, as its name 
suggests, the Surface Water Quantity Management Framework for the Lower Athabasca River applies 
only to the Athabasca River, with triggers and limits presently monitored and evaluated at only one 
monitoring station. Second, management frameworks to which the LARP commits, such as a new 
Biodiversity Management Framework which set targets for selected biodiversity indicators and 
addresses caribou habitat needs [24] (p. 28), have not yet been developed. Finally, there is no 
commitment to develop management frameworks for the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the 
oil sands activity in the Lower Athabasca Region. There is similarly no commitment to develop a 
Traditional Land Use Management Framework, directed at protecting First Nations’ treaty rights and 
traditional land uses from the cumulative impacts of oil sands development. The significance of this 
omission was noted in a recent Joint Review Panel Report on the proposed Jackpine Mine Expansion 
(the “Jackpine JRP Report”), an oil sands operation within the Lower Athabasca Region [28]. 
Meanwhile, decision-making and development approvals continue within the Lower Athabasca 
Region despite the presence of these gaps. This necessarily compels decision-making in relation to 
these environmental impacts on a project-by-project rather than a cumulative effects management  
basis [28] (paragraph 36). Decision-makers cannot wait until these management frameworks are in 
place. The LARP itself makes it clear that decision-makers “must not adjourn, defer, deny, refuse or 
reject any application, proceeding or decision making process before it” by reason only of non-compliance 
with a provision or incompletion of any direction or commitment in either the LARP Strategic Plan or the 
LARP Implementation Plan” [24] (section 7(3)). Given this, the Jackpine JRP recognized that it was 
“critical that the frameworks, plans, and thresholds identified in the LARP be put in place as quickly as 
possible” [28] (paragraph 14), and thus encouraged the government of Alberta “to continue the 
processes associated with implementation of the LARP on anurgent basis” [28] (paragraph 32). 
However, unlike SARA as discussed below, beyond encouraging the executive to fully implement 
the LARP, there is no means to compel the completion of management frameworks even when the 
LARP itself contemplates their creation within specified timelines. Rather, until approved, these 
management frameworks are referred to in sections of the LARP which are “not intended to have 
binding effect”, serving instead as statements of government policy to guide government,  
decision-makers and local government bodies [24] (Sections 4 and 5). In other words, there is no role 
for the courts to require the executive to fill these gaps. Until this happens the LARP as currently 
implemented cannot be said to be more than an “essential first step” [28] (paragraph 1806) in the shift 
to a cumulative impacts management approach in the Lower Athabasca Region. 
Even then, the LARP leaves it to Ministerial discretion to ultimately determine the length of this 
first step. At present, the air quality and surface water quality management frameworks for the Lower 
Athabasca region each specify air quality and surface water quality limits—which according to the 
LARP are designed to set clear system based boundaries that are not to be exceeded. However, when 
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one or more of the limits is exceeded, the LARP leaves it to the Minister to issue a notice that, amongst 
other things, specifies the “action to be taken by the affected decision-makers […] in response to the 
exceedance of the limit” [24] (Sections 25(1)(g),(h) and 32(1)(g),(h)). It remains to be seen how the 
Minister will exercise this discretion in the face of an exceedance. However, the Jackpine JRP Report 
envisages that this may happen sooner rather than later, with modeling from the Mine’s proponent 
predicting that LARP limits for both NO2 and SO2 will be exceeded in the regional study area where 
the mine expansion is planned [28] (paragraphs 275–276). The Panel was also “of the view that many 
oil sands facilities have been approved but not yet built and that model predictions serve as a warning 
that the (Alberta Ambient Air Quality Objectives) and LARP limits may be exceeded when all 
approved oil sands facilities become operational” [28] (paragraph 277). If this occurs, the Minister will 
need to decide the action to be taken in the face of the exceedance under a regional plan that contains a 
vision of both optimizing the economic potential of the oil sands and maintaining healthy ecosystems 
and the environment through a cumulative impact management approach. 
2.4. Summary 
The ALSA project is a work in progress. Full implementation depends on the continued exercise of 
Executive discretion in a manner that remains faithful to the Framework’s stated goals and the Act’s 
purposes. Until this occurs, it is not possible to conclude that a gap exists between the ambition of this 
statute and its actual implementation. However, if ALSA does fail to fulfill its environmental promise, 
the root cause may well be traced back to the decision of the legislature to afford excessive discretion 
to the executive to implement this progressive legislation, with little room available to the courts to 
constrain the exercise of this discretion or oversee ALSA’s implementation.  
3. The Species at Risk Act 
It has been roughly four decades since scientists first began to appreciate what is now understood as 
the “sixth major mass extinction event of all geological time.” [29] The United States was one of the 
first countries to take this threat seriously, passing its Endangered Species Act [30] in the early 1970s 
as part of that country’s environmental decade. Two decades later, Canada committed to develop 
legislation for the protection of threatened species as the first signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity (1992) [31]. It took another decade for Parliament to pass SARA. 
If ALSA is an example of what environmental law should be (proactive, preventative, and 
ecosystem-based), then SARA and its various counterparts have the dubious (if to some extent 
unavoidable) distinction of being inherently reactive, a sort of “emergency room” for species facing 
the threat of extinction. SARA’s stated purpose is “to prevent wildlife species from being extirpated or 
becoming extinct, to provide for the recovery of wildlife species that are extirpated, endangered or 
threatened… and to manage species of special concern to prevent them from becoming endangered or 
threatened” [17] (Section 6). Thus, although peppered with preventative language, SARA’s protective 
regime is really only engaged when a species is in trouble, which, as a general rule, is something that 
good environmental laws should avoid or at least minimize. 
However, as further discussed below, when SARA’s protective regime is engaged, the legislation 
makes up for its reactive nature by imposing numerous mandatory duties on relevant government 
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departments to ensure that species are given the best possible chance at recovery. In this way, SARA 
appears to be following the footsteps of its older American cousin, described as the “pit bull” of that 
country’s environmental law regime [32].  
3.1. Brief Overview of the Legislative Scheme [33] 
As with all such legislation, a species must be legally listed to receive protection under the Act. Under 
SARA, this is a two-stage process with the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada 
(COSEWIC) recommending species for listing but the ultimate decision lying with the Governor in 
Council (Cabinet) [17] (Section 27). When a species is listed as either endangered, threatened or 
extirpated, two basic prohibitions apply. The first is a prohibition against harming, collecting or trading in 
that species [17] (Section 32); the second is a prohibition against destroying its “residence” [17]  
(Section 33). For reasons not relevant here but of considerable practical importance [34], these prohibitions 
only apply on federal lands, to aquatic species and to migratory birds under the Migratory Birds 
Convention Act, 1994 [35]. 
Listing also triggers a two-stage recovery process. The first stage involves the preparation of a 
“recovery strategy,” a draft of which must be completed within set time frames. The recovery strategy 
must include a description of any identified “critical habitat”: “the habitat that is necessary for the 
survival or recovery of a listed wildlife species...” [17] (Section 2). In the second stage, an “action 
plan” is developed, outlining the specific measures to be taken to implement the recovery strategy and 
including the identification of any additional critical habitat.  
Identification of critical habitat is a prerequisite to its protection, which under SARA is achieved 
through two principal mechanisms. The first and arguably preferred mechanism (by the current federal 
government at least) [36] is stewardship activities through conservation agreements [17] (Section 11); 
the second is the prohibition against destruction of critical habitat [17] (Section 58). As with the 
prohibitions mentioned above, the critical habitat prohibition is limited to federal lands, aquatic species, the 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Canada, and to migratory birds under the MBCA, 1994. 
Finally, and as a partial response to the federal limits referred to in the previous paragraphs, SARA 
contains “safety net” provisions authorizing federal protection of a species and/or its critical habitat 
that otherwise falls squarely under provincial jurisdiction [17] (Sections 34,61,80).  
We consider the implementation of each of these elements—listing, the recovery process, and the 
safety-net—in further detail below. Each demonstrates the positive effects of limited or constrained 
discretion in achieving SARA’s goals. The latter two elements also illustrate the positive role that the 
law, here in the form of the courts, can play in assisting environmental laws to fulfill their promise.  
3.2. SARA as Constrained Discretion Legislation 
3.2.1. The Listing Process 
As noted above, COSEWIC plays a fundamental but not exclusive role in species listing. Pursuant 
to Section 27, COSEWIC makes a recommendation to Cabinet which then has nine months to decide 
between three options. It can accept the recommendation and list the species; it can decline the 
recommendation, but in such a case must provide reasons for the decision; or it can return the issue to 
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COSEWIC for further clarification [17] (Section 27) [37]. This approach, which has been described as 
an example of “constrained discretion,” was actually the result of a last minute political compromise 
that ensured SARA’s passage [38]. Proponents “believed it would lead to a higher rate of species listing 
than the purely discretionary approach—that the timing and transparency requirements would induce 
cabinet to list more species than it otherwise would” [38]. The other approaches to listing adopted in 
other jurisdictions are scientific listing (i.e., no discretion), and full discretion. 
The mere existence of this “constrained discretion” approach is worth noting. It demonstrates that 
unbounded discretion is not an immutable characteristic of Canadian environmental law. Elgie has 
tested the claim that different approaches affect the rate of listing. Setting aside the scientific listing 
jurisdictions, the results showed “a substantial difference in listing rates between jurisdictions with 
‘Full Discretion’ (35%) and those with ‘Constrained Discretion’ (78%)” [38] (p. 14), supporting the 
general thesis that constraining discretion will lead to faster listing.  
3.2.2. Recovery Strategies 
The basic elements of the recovery strategy process were recently set out in detail by Bankes [39]. 
Briefly, section 37 requires a “competent minister” to prepare a recovery strategy for an endangered or 
threatened species. Section 41 sets out the requisite elements of a recovery strategy, including the 
“identification of the species’ critical habitat, to the extent possible, based on the best available 
information”. Pursuant to Section 42, proposed recovery strategies for species listed as endangered 
when the ‘List of Wildlife Species at Risk’ came into force (23 June 2003) were required within three 
years, whereas for threatened species it was four years. For all subsequently listed species, proposed 
recovery strategies are to be posted within one year for endangered species and two years for those that 
are threatened. Finally, pursuant to Section 58 and with respect to species not found in national parks, 
a competent minister has 180 days after a recovery strategy or action plan is posted to either confirm 
and explain through a “protection statement” that any identified critical habitat is legally protected or 
issue a “protection order” to achieve this effect. 
Each of these requirements has been contested by the federal government, resulting in delays and 
eventually litigation by various environmental organizations [40]. In each case, the courts rules against 
the federal government and have interpreted the relevant provisions as non-discretionary.  
3.2.2.1. Identification of Critical Habitat 
SARA’s “critical habitat” provisions have been considered in three cases but only the first, Alberta 
Wilderness Assn v Canada (Minister of the Environment) [Greater Sage Grouse] [41], is directly 
relevant here. In that case, the applicants sought judicial review of the recovery strategy for the Greater 
sage grouse on the basis that it failed to identify any “critical habitat” even though the existence of 
such habitat was widely known. Foreshadowing future SARA litigation, the respondent Minister  
did not actually dispute the non-discretionary nature of the critical habitat provisions but rather 
attempted—unsuccessfully—to shield this failure from review by framing it as a question of fact 
requiring curial deference [41] (paragraphs 45–57). Consequently, the interpretation endorsed by the 
Court required the Minister to “identify in a recovery strategy document as much critical habitat as it is 
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possible to identify at that time, even if all of it cannot be identified, and to do so based on the best 
information then available” [41] (paragraph 25). 
In other words, the Minister has a “duty to identify critical habitat for the species as part of 
preparing a recovery strategy and an action plan” [39] (p. 40). The Court noted that such a requirement 
“reflects the precautionary principle that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’” [41] (paragraph 25), citing the Supreme Court of Canada in its landmark 
decision Spraytech v. Hudson (Town) [42]. While the Minister did not argue for any discretion, the 
record before the Court did include a draft policy document that strongly hinted at an interpretation 
whereby the Minister would have some discretion to identify critical habitat at either the recovery 
strategy stage or at the action plan stage [41] (paragraph 41). This policy and the Court’s comments on 
it are worth noting because they illustrate the potential harm to species that would result if indeed the 
identification of critical habitat were discretionary [41] (paragraph 42): 
This draft policy does imply…discretion whether to identify critical habitat in a 
recovery strategy or in an action plan and it leans strongly to the identification in the action 
plan, rather than in the recovery strategy. As the applicants point out, this leaves 
endangered species at risk as there is no timeline set out in the SARA for posting an action 
plan, whereas there is a short time frame set out in Section 42 of the SARA for the posting 
of a recovery strategy. 
As environmental groups were just learning, however, the federal government was also flagrantly 
ignoring the legislated times frames set out in Section 42, as the next section sets out. 
3.3.2.2. Timeframes 
Section 42’s timeframes were the subject of the most recent SARA litigation. In Western Canada 
Wilderness Committee v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) [White Sturgeon] [43], the applicants sought 
declaratory relief and mandamus with respect to the long overdue recovery strategies for four distinct 
species: the White Sturgeon (Nechako River population), the Humpback Whale (North Pacific 
population), the Marbled Murrelet and the Woodland Caribou (Southern Mountain population). 
As in Greater Sage Grouse, the respondent Ministers (Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Environment 
Canada) acknowledged that “SARA does not confer any discretion on the Ministers” to extend the time for 
the preparation of recovery strategies, that the Ministers were “legally required to comply with the statutory 
timelines and they have not done so,” and that these breaches “were not minor: there were ‘substantial 
delays’” [43] (paragraph 41). Also as in Greater Sage Grouse, the Ministers’ unsuccessful defense was 
primarily rooted in principles of administrative law [43] (paragraphs 115–122). Although the Court 
declined to grant mandamus for reasons of mootness (with respect to the proposed recovery strategies that 
had recently been released, a point to which we return below) [43] (paragraphs 114–115) and prematurity 
(with respect to the final recovery strategies) [43] (paragraphs 123–124), it did grant the declaratory relief 
sought, i.e., that the Ministers had “acted unlawfully in failing to post proposed recovery 
strategies…within the statutory timelines prescribed in the [SARA]” [43]. 
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As in Greater sage grouse, the Court demonstrated a clear understanding of the rationale 
behind the mandatory timelines, echoing the aforementioned “emergency room” nature of the 
legislation [43] (paragraphs 102): 
To state the obvious, [SARA] was enacted because some wildlife species in Canada are at 
risk. As the applicants note, many are in a race against the clock as increased pressure is put on 
their critical habitat, and their ultimate survival may be at stake… Compliance with the statutory 
timelines is critical to the proper implementation of the Parliamentary scheme for the protection 
of species at risk. 
3.2.2.3. Protection Statements v. Protection Orders 
Once critical habitat has been identified, whether in a recovery strategy or action plan, Section 58 
requires a competent minister to either issue a protection statement or make a protection order. The 
former is essentially a statement by the competent Minister explaining how the identified critical 
habitat is already “legally protected” under existing rules, while the latter is effectively a new 
regulation providing such protection where there is none or there are gaps in the existing protection. 
The choice between these two was one of the main issues raised in Georgia Strait Alliance v Canada 
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) [Killer Whale] [44]. 
Unlike Greater Sage Grouse and White Sturgeon, in Killer Whale the Minister did argue for 
discretion: “Parliament intended to afford some flexibility for the manner in which critical habitat 
protection is provided. Any protection statement…does not have to rely upon statutory provisions and 
instruments which provide protection ‘in the same manner as the protection order’” [44] (paragraph 
260). As in Greater Sage Grouse and White Sturgeon, however, the Court held that the relevant 
provisions were non-discretionary [44] (paragraph 272) (an interpretation subsequently upheld by the 
Federal Court of Appeal [45]):  
When read in context, subsection 58(5) mandates the minister to ensure that critical 
habitat is “legally protected.” The minister is obliged to make a protection order under 
subsection 58(5)(a) “if the critical habitat or any portion of the critical habitat is not legally 
protected...” I do not think that subsection 58(5)(a) should, or can, be read so as to provide 
the Minister with an “option” to forgo making a protection order under subsection 58(5)(a) 
unless the alternative sources of protection are of the same kind, degree and scope as the 
protection afforded by subsection 58(5)(a)... 
In other words, the Minister has a “duty to provide for the legal protection of identified critical 
habitat” [39] (p. 40). In addition and to an even greater extent than Greater Sage grouse, the Court 
considered the weaknesses and dangers inherent to a discretionary approach [44] (paragraph 279): 
This [discretionary] approach is problematic in two ways. First, it conflicts with a plain 
and ordinary reading of SARA in context. Second, it is contrary to Parliament’s expressed 
intent that the basic protections of SARA (to which there are exceptions) should be 
mandatory and should not rest with the discretion of particular ministers. These ministers, 
no doubt, will face enormous pressures from time to time to back away from or modify 
those mandatory prohibitions for purposes of political or economic expedience. As the 
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Parliamentary debates show, however, this is the very reason why Parliament opted for 
mandatory prohibition over ministerial discretion…  
Thus, the Federal Court recognized what the Canadian Bar Association (in its submissions before 
Parliament) [46] and numerous scholars have long argued that discretionary decision-making is “subject to 
the political, economic, and social winds of the time and place in which any particular decision occurs” and 
that “such winds usually favour business as usual,” not environmental protection [47]. 
3.2.3. The Safety-Net 
Pursuant to Section 80, if a competent Minister is of the opinion that a species faces “an imminent 
threat to its survival or recovery,” he or she must recommend that the Governor in Council (i.e., the 
federal Cabinet) make an “emergency order to provide for the protection of a listed wildlife species” 
(an EPO). The federal cabinet is not obligated to follow the recommendation, but if it does the EPO is 
not restricted to federal lands in the same way that SARA’s other provisions are. The safety net 
provisions have twice been considered by the courts. In Adam v. Canada (Environment)  
[Boreal Caribou] [48], the applicants had attempted to persuade the Minister of the Environment to 
recommend an EPO for boreal caribou. The Minister ultimately declined to do so after concluding that 
“there are no imminent threats to the national survival or recovery of boreal caribou in Canada,” a 
conclusion that the applicants challenged as unreasonable [48] (paragraph 3). The second case, Alberta 
Wilderness Association v Canada (Attorney General) [Greater Sage Grouse II] [49], is actually the 
most recent decision in what can be described as the Greater sage-grouse saga, a saga in which that 
species has continued to decline notwithstanding the earlier court victory and for which therefore the 
applicants also sought an EPO. 
Viewed together, this litigation suggests that the safety net provisions operate somewhat like the 
listing process, which is to say as a constrained discretion scheme. As with COSEWIC’s 
recommendation in the listing process, the Minister’s recommendation under the safety net provisions 
is also supposed to be science-based. In Boreal Caribou, it was the Minister’s inability to reconcile his 
conclusion not to recommend in the face of “substantial scientific and other evidence” to the contrary 
that rendered his decision unreasonable [48] (paragraphs 66–68). That being said, all parties were 
agreed from the outset that “even if the Minister had made a recommendation…the Governor in 
Council may have declined to issue the requested EPO, after weighing and balancing relevant  
public-interest considerations” [48] (paragraph 4).  
On this latter front, Greater Sage Grouse II provides additional, if somewhat indirect, support for 
the idea that transparency requirements (here the Minister’s recommendation) may induce 
governments to take more protective decisions than they otherwise would. This support is indirect 
because it can only be inferred, but there are at least two grounds for doing so. The first is the government’s 
strenuous efforts to keep the contents of that recommendation secret [49] (paragraph 43–50); the second is 
the fact that, shortly after the Federal Court of Appeal’s ruling that such efforts were unlawful, Cabinet did 
in fact issue an EPO for the Greater sage grouse, the first such order under SARA [50].  
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3.3. Summary 
While ALSA demonstrates the capacity for legislative regimes to tackle complex problems like the 
management of cumulative effects, SARA demonstrates that legislatures are perfectly capable of 
limiting or structuring discretion in ways that promote positive environmental outcomes; they can even 
incorporate the sometimes-maligned precautionary principle [51] in a way that gives it “some work to 
do” [52]. Yet, SARA is not a story of timely and successful implementation. In his 2013 Fall Report to 
Parliament, the federal Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) 
noted, inter alia, that “Environment Canada continues to have a significant number of outstanding 
recovery strategies… 84 percent were overdue by more than three years as of 31 March 2013. Of the 
recovery strategies that the organizations completed, 43 percent did not identify the critical habitat of 
the species at risk” [36]. 
In our view, SARA’s relatively poor track record can at least partially be explained through the 
adage “old habits die hard.” As the Killer Whale court noted, Canadian politicians and bureaucracies 
have long been steeped in a culture of discretionary decision-making and do not appear inclined to let 
go [44] (paragraph 280). This explains why discretionary laws such as ALSA are still so pervasive but 
it also explains why, in those rare instances where a less discretionary law such as SARA is passed, 
there may still be problems in implementation. The important difference between these two statutes, of 
course, is that the latter example (SARA) entails unlawful conduct, a point picked up by the courts in most 
of the SARA litigation. Nooksack Dace (one of the other critical habitat cases not discussed here) [53] was 
described by the Court as “a story about the creation and application of policy by the Minister in clear 
contravention of the law, and a reluctance to be held accountable for failure to follow the law” [53] 
(paragraph 2) while the Court in White Sturgeon felt compelled to remind the Ministers that “public 
officials are not above the law” [43] (paragraph 66). Finally, in what can only be considered a rebuke 
of the government’s efforts to conceal the status of the Minister’s recommendation in Greater Sage 
Grouse II, the Court invoked what is perhaps still the most important Canadian decision on the rule of 
law—Roncarelli v Duplessis [54], wherein the relevant Minister (Duplessis) had revoked a restaurant 
owner’s liquor license on the unlawful basis that the latter was using his profits to bail Jehovah’s 
Witnesses out of jail. 
In addition to explaining SARA’s poor record “on the ground,” the government’s refusal to comply 
with SARA’s relatively strict provisions also highlights the positive role that can be played by the 
courts “to see that important legislative purposes…are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of 
the federal bureaucracy” [19]. Indeed, there would probably still be no critical habitat identified or 
EPO issued for the Greater sage grouse, no proposed recovery strategies for the White Sturgeon and 
Marbled Murrelet, and no legal protection for the Killer Whale’s critical habitat absent litigation and 
the courts’ insistence on adherence to the rule of law [43] (paragraph 133).  
That being said, resort to litigation is by no means an optimal solution. Litigation is costly, labor 
intensive and time consuming, the latter being especially problematic in the SARA context as 
evidenced in the Greater Sage Grouse II litigation. There, in an effort to save time, the applicants 
sought both mandamus to force the Minister to make a decision regarding a Section 80 
recommendation and, in the alternative, judicial review of his decision if he had already decided 
against such a recommendation. Justice Pelletier expressed some sympathy for the applicants’ plight, 
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but ultimately concluded that such pleadings were not helpful [49] (paragraph 36): “This  
well-intentioned but ill-conceived effort to save time has resulted in this application being stalled for 
more than a year on a procedural point of document production which does not begin to address the 
merits of the appellants’ legitimate preoccupation with the survival of the remaining Canadian stocks  
of Sage-grouse.” 
In light of these challenges, several jurisdictions have experimented with specialized environmental 
tribunals. We consider the experience with one such tribunal—Alberta’s Environmental Appeals 
Board—in the next part of this paper. 
4. The Environmental Appeals Board of Alberta 
The Environmental Appeals Board of Alberta (EAB) [55] was established in 1993 with the entry 
into force of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act (EPEA) [18], Alberta’s omnibus 
environmental legislation which deals with such diverse matters as air and water pollution and 
environmental assessment. The EAB can consider appeals of government decisions under a number of 
statutes including EPEA and the Water Act [56]. These include decisions in relation to water licenses, 
reclamation certificates and environmental protection orders. The historical record suggests that both 
industry and civil society favoured the introduction of an appeal regime. Industry wanted an appeal 
mechanism because of concerns as to the lack of consistency in the permitting process. Civil society 
favoured an appeal mechanism as a way of providing an additional opportunity for public input into 
government permitting and licensing procedures [57]. 
An EAB may also serve the function of “shining a light” on the administrative procedures of those 
line departments of government responsible for licensing new projects and developments [57]. 
Government bureaucracies have a tendency to follow past practices and to be insufficiently inattentive 
to the principles and purposes articulated in modern environmental statutes. An EAB process provides 
one way of examining departmental decision-making in light of such principles and purposes. For 
example, the reasoned decision of an EAB may examine and articulate the relationship between a 
particular licensing power and the precautionary principle or the polluter pays principle [58].  
An expert appeal mechanism is far more likely than a judicial review application to achieve such a 
result for two related reasons. First, expert appeal procedures are generally structured as de novo 
appeals in which the parties may present new evidence. Such an appeal is not simply a review of the 
existing record. A second and related point is that the appeal body does not owe a duty of deference to 
the original statutory decision maker. In more technical terms, the standard of review is more likely to 
be correctness rather than reasonableness. By contrast, judicial review procedures are typically 
structured as reviews on the basis of the existing record and characterized by a high degree of 
deference to the statutory decision-maker. The review is more likely to be on the basis of 
reasonableness rather than correctness [59]. Hence, if the statutory decision-maker’s decision falls 
within the range of possible responses a reviewing court will not interfere. Furthermore, a reviewing 
court never gets to act as the substitute decision-maker or to draft new terms and conditions under 
which a project might have been approved. The most the reviewing court can do is to send the matter 
back to the original decision maker with directions to correct the error of jurisdiction or law that has 
been identified. 
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However, the ability of a body like the EAB to “shine a light” on the administrative practices within 
the line departments responsible for licensing and permitting decisions for an array of resource 
development projects depends upon two related things: the scope of the provisions that trigger the 
review jurisdiction of the Board, and the scope of the standing provisions that allow a party to take a 
case to the Board. The trigger provisions are not the focus of this paper although we will see that the 
two issues are interrelated and cannot be completely separated. In general, the trigger provisions of the 
legislation afford the Board jurisdiction over a broad range of decisions except appeals from planning 
level decisions [18,56,57]. More recently, the creation of a “single window” energy regulator in the 
province with the authority to make licensing and permitting decisions (that historically would have 
been made by line departments) where those decisions relate to energy projects, has further limited the 
availability of appeals [60]. 
The focus of this part of the paper is the second possible limitation on the jurisdiction of a board 
like the EAB, the relevant standing rules. Where a project has a direct effect on private interests there 
is typically little difficulty in acquiring standing to appeal a statutory decision to a board like the EAB, 
or judicial review in front of a court. However, where a project affects public interests (and all projects 
must do so to some degree insofar as they have the potential to impair public values and resources 
including ecosystem values, air and water quality, and public resources such as the capacity of the 
atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases without interfering with the climate system) it may be much 
more difficult for a party claiming to represent that interest to acquire standing. This is significant 
since it is public interests and values that typically go uncompensated in resource development 
projects. Discrete private interests are far more likely to be engaged and compensated by project 
proponents than are public interests. These interests may go unaddressed for want of an advocate or 
will simply be factored in to some general Kaldor/Hicks cost benefit analysis. 
This part of the paper draws attention to the fact that the EAB in Alberta, in common with other 
regulatory bodies in the province [61], has labored under restrictive statutory standing rules which 
have limited the Board’s authority to “shine a light” on the permitting and licensing practices of line 
departments. Furthermore, the Board itself has been timid in the application of the standing rules and 
the courts in reviewing Board decisions have certainly not encouraged it to be more imaginative. This 
stands in stark contrast to the general jurisprudence on standing in the ordinary courts. Here, we see 
the courts articulating a broad view of the concept of public interest standing in order to reinforce 
important and fundamental values such as accountability and the rule of law. The contrast between the 
narrow statutory standing jurisprudence for tribunals like the EAB and the more liberal jurisprudence 
of the general courts is unhelpful given the role that we want boards like the EAB to play in protecting 
public interests. 
The balance of this part of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the law of 
the general courts on public interest standing. This is followed by a description of the standing rules of 
the EAB as well as the practice of the Board and the jurisprudence of the Courts in reviewing the 
Board’s practice. The discussion concludes by suggesting how we might move forward. 
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4.1. The Law of the General Courts on Public Interest Standing 
Canadian Courts first started to articulate a liberal view of public interest standing in a series of 
constitutional cases beginning in the mid-1970s [62,63]. The Supreme Court of Canada extended this 
to mainstream administrative law in the mid-1980s [64]. The Court liberalized the rules still further in 
its recent decision in Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against 
Violence [65]. Prior to this most recent decision, the general law on public interest standing with 
respect to both constitutional and administrative law matters could be summarized as follows. While a 
party with private interest standing (i.e., a party directly affected by the matter and in way that was 
distinct from that of other members of society) might have an audience before the Courts as of right, a 
Court may afford a party standing on a discretionary “public interest” basis where that party can 
establish three things. First, the party should be able to establish that it was raising a serious justiciable 
issue. In other words, the application must raise a point of law rather than a question of policy or 
politics. Second, the party should be able to establish a real stake or a genuine interest in the issue. 
While the term “real stake” hearkens back to the idea of a private interest, the “genuine interest” 
concept is clearly more malleable. Public interest interveners typically address this question by 
referring to the objects and purposes clause of their incorporation or society status and by pointing to a 
track record of activism in the area. Third, the party must be able to show that the proposed suit is a 
reasonable and effective way of bringing the issue before the courts. In some cases, this has been 
expressed more restrictively as requiring the party to show that there is no other reasonable and 
effective means of bringing the issue to the Court. This last criterion can pose an obstacle for the 
environmental public interest litigant since, as noted above, a development project will frequently 
engage private as well as public interests. Thus, in many cases, there will be a private party who has 
standing as of right to appeal or seek judicial review of a statutory decision. However, such a party 
may lack the resources or interest to pursue the matter and in any event may only be interested in 
protecting or raising private interests. That party may also have had its concerns addressed by the 
proponent. If applied restrictively, therefore, this third criterion may be used to deny an applicant 
public interest standing. 
This was precisely the issue in Downtown Eastside Sex Workers. In that case, the applicant Society 
sought to question the validity of sections of the Criminal Code. The Attorney General took the 
position that the Society had no standing to raise the issue since there were other individuals (e.g., 
individual sex workers) who would clearly have standing as of right. The Supreme Court however 
ruled that this should not be conclusive of the issue and granted standing. The Court referred to a 
number of factors in support of that conclusion: including the public importance of the issue 
transcending immediate private interests; the comprehensive nature of the challenge; the skill and 
expertise of the applicant; and the court’s own assessment that it was unlikely that an individual with 
standing would raise all of the issues that the applicant sought to question [65] (paragraph 73). More 
generally, the Court favoured a purposive approach to the assessment of standing. The Court located 
its approach to standing in the principle of legality which contains two ideas, “that state action should 
conform to the Constitution and statutory authority and that there must be practical and effective ways 
to challenge the legality of state action” [65] (paragraph 31). 
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In sum, the ordinary Courts have developed relatively liberal rule of standing to accommodate 
public interest litigation. There is no standing as of right but the Courts retain the discretion to grant 
standing where they can be convinced that this is a reasonable and effective way of assessing the 
legality of state action. 
4.2. Standing before the Environmental Appeals Board  
The ordinary Courts develop their standing rules as part of their inherent jurisdiction to control their 
own procedure. In the case of an appeal board, the standing rules will necessarily be prescribed by 
statute because the question of who may commence an appeal is an essential part of establishing the 
jurisdiction of the board. The interpretation of those statutory standing rules falls, first of all, to the 
board itself. 
The statutory standing rules for the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) provide in general terms 
that an appeal may be commenced by the person who applied for the relevant statutory approval, 
permit or licence and by “any person who previously submitted a statement of concern … and who is 
directly affected by the … decision” [18] (Section 91) [56] Section 115(1)). Thus, an environmental 
organization or other potential public interest intervener must establish both that it filed a statement of 
concern and that it is directly affected. Such organizations have also pursued another avenue for access 
to the Board arguing to the effect that the Board still has the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal even 
where the organization cannot establish that it is directly affected if it can establish that it meets the 
tests for public interest standing developed by the ordinary courts and discussed above. However, 
neither approach has proven successful for public interest litigants. The Board has taken a narrow 
approach to the interpretation and assessment of “directly affected” and rejected outright the 
suggestion that it has any authority to hear an appeal based upon the public interest standing of an 
applicant [57,66]. The courts have generally declined to interfere with the Board’s interpretation and 
application of the test [67–69]. 
Both points are clearly established in an EAB decision and subsequent judicial review application 
in a case involving applications to amend large volume irrigation licences [66]. The statutory decision 
maker granted the applications and three public interest environmental organizations (the ENGOs) 
filed appeals arguing that the amendments were unlawful. The EAB put at issue the standing of the 
ENGOs to initiate the appeal and set that matter down for decision before considering the merits of the 
appeals. All three ENGOs argued that they were directly affected, or, in the alternative, that they 
should be granted public interest standing with the necessary implication that this was sufficient to 
accord the Board the jurisdiction to consider the appeals. In support of their claim to standing on both 
grounds, the ENGOs all provided evidence of their long-standing commitment to some or all of the 
following issues: watershed and conservation planning, water allocation and transfer matters, and 
instream flow and healthy aquatic ecosystems. The ENGOs also emphasized that the interpretation of 
the term “directly affected” should be informed by the statement of purposes in the Water Act which 
include the following [56] (Section 2):  
The purpose of this Act is to support and promote the conservation and management of 
water, including the wise allocation and use of water, while recognizing:  
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(a) the need to manage and conserve water resources to sustain our environment and to 
ensure a healthy environment and high quality of life in the present and the future;  
(d) the shared responsibility of all Alberta citizens for the conservation and wise use of 
water and their role in providing advice with respect to water management planning 
and decision-making;  
(f) the important role of comprehensive and responsive action in administering this Act. 
In considering the directly affected issue, the Board confirmed that “When the Board assesses the 
directly affected status of an appellant, the Board looks at how the person uses the area where the 
project will be located, how the project will affect the environment, and how the effect on the 
environment will affect the person’s use of the area. The closer these elements are connected  
(their proximity), the more likely the person is directly affected. The onus is on the appellant to present 
a prima facie case that he or she is directly affected” [66] (paragraph 105). By “proximity”, what is 
meant is “how closely tied” the decision is with “the possible effects on a natural resource and the 
possible effects on the appellant’s use of that resource” [66] (paragraph 124). Thus, the test is very 
much a “land-based” test, or as the Board puts it later in its decision, “The cornerstone of all the cases 
before the Board is the factual impact of the proposed project on individuals” [66] (paragraph 116). 
Thus, engagement with the issues identified in the purposes of the Water Act is not sufficient to meet 
the directly affected test. A “genuine interest” does not suffice [66] (paragraph 119), and neither does 
engagement in water management and ecosystem protection [66] (paragraph 123) or the assumption of 
an advisory role [66] (paragraph 126). The Board offered the following additional guidance [66] 
(paragraph 109): 
The effect on the appellant does not have to be unique in kind or magnitude. However, the 
effect the Board is looking for needs to be more than an effect on the public at large  
(it must be personal and individual in nature), and the interest which the appellant is 
asserting as being affected must be something more than the generalized interest that all 
Albertans have in protecting the environment. Under EPEA and the Water Act, the 
Legislature chose to restrict the right of appeal to those who are directly affected by the 
Director’s decision. If the Legislature had intended for any member of the public to be 
allowed to appeal, it could have used the phrase “any person” in describing who has the 
right to appeal. It did not; it chose to restrict the right of appeal to a more limited class. The 
Legislature, in using the more restrictive language, also did not intend for the Board to provide 
a general right of review for the Director’s decision; it intended it be something narrower. 
The Board also had to grapple with an issue that had been before it on numerous previous 
occasions, namely the application of such a land-based, directly affected test, to a group, and 
especially a membership based group like the Alberta Wilderness Association or Trout Unlimited. 
Here, the Board emphasized that a group could not obtain standing independently of its members. That 
is to say, in order for the group to obtain standing it would need to show that at least some of its 
members (and perhaps a majority), would be “individually and personally impacted by the Director’s 
decision”—and in the land or resource-based way discussed above. Since the applicants had not 
presented evidence of the interest of particular members, they were therefore unable to claim standing 
based on the “directly affected” test. 
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That left the applicants with the claim based on public interest standing. The Board, applying a  
pre-Downtown Eastside version of the test, was clearly not convinced that the case law on public 
interest standing in the ordinary courts was of any application here [66] (paragraph 133). While the 
Board agreed that there was a serious issue to be determined (the legality of the amendments) [66] 
(paragraph 135), it seems to have concluded that no other elements of the test were satisfied. The issue 
was not justiciable; the applicants might have had a genuine interest in licence amendments generally but 
perhaps not with respect to these amendments; and there were reasonable and effective means for the issue 
to be brought before the Courts\the Board i.e., a person who was directly affected [66] (paragraph 147). 
More generally however, and with no additional reasoning, the Board simply concluded that “Granting 
public interest standing is not within the Board’s jurisdiction” [66] (paragraph 141). 
It does not appear as if the applicants sought judicial review of the Board’s decision under the 
directly affected test but they did seek judicial review of the public interest standing matter arguing 
both that the Board had erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to grant public interest standing 
and by wrongly concluding that the applicants had not met the tests. Justice Hall only dealt with the 
jurisdictional issue and for him the issue was not so much the jurisdiction to grant public interest 
standing as much as it was the proposition that the Board only had the jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
from a party that was directly affected. This is quite different from a judicial review setting in the 
courts in which standing is treated as a procedural matter rather than as a substantive jurisdictional 
matter. Justice Hall put the point as follows [67] (paragraph 27): 
With respect to an appeal of the Director’s decisions to amend water licences, the Board 
only has the jurisdiction that was granted to it by the provisions of the Water Act. The 
Water Act did not grant the Board the jurisdiction to hear public interest appeals. It can 
only hear appeals from parties directly affected by the decisions of the Director. The Board 
receives its jurisdiction from the provisions of the Water Act. It is a legislated jurisdiction. 
The Board cannot exceed that jurisdiction. The Board has no inherent jurisdiction. 
In conclusion, the ability of board like the Environmental Appeals Board to shine a light on the 
permitting practices of a line Department and take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of 
permitting statutes will only be effective if the EAB is able to assume jurisdiction over important 
cases. Narrow standing rules may seriously inhibit the Board’s ability to discharge this important 
function. The analysis here suggests that the standing rules built into the legislation and the Board’s 
interpretation of those rules have had this effect in the case of Alberta’s EAB. 
The legislative rules are narrow in two respects. First, the “directly affected” test is a demanding 
test to meet. It is certainly much more demanding than a genuine interest test. Second, since the 
“directly affected” language also serves as a trigger to Board jurisdiction, this language serves to 
ensure that any decision by the Board to grant a party public interest standing will not be enough to 
afford the Board jurisdiction to consider the matter if it does not already have jurisdiction by some 
other means. Thus, if a party who is directly affected initiates the appeal, another party who might 
have been afforded public interest standing will not be able to sustain the application if the directly 
affected party withdraws its objections. 
The Board has more room to move with respect to the interpretation and application of the “directly 
affected” test than it does with respect to the jurisdictional issue just discussed. As Justice Hall points 
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out, the legislature has restricted the categories of persons who can launch an appeal. The Board 
cannot add an additional category, i.e., persons with a genuine interest—and any attempt to do so 
would be met by an application for judicial review in which the standard of review would be 
correctness [68] (paragraph 27). The Board could, however, take a more expansive view of “directly 
affected” and interpret that term in a less physical way and in a way that is informed by the purposes of 
the statute. A decision on such a matter is more likely to be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness 
rather than on the basis of correctness [59]. 
4.3. Summary 
An environmental appeal board is an important tool in fostering a purposive interpretation of 
environmental statutes. An EAB can only serve that enlightened role if it is allowed to assume 
jurisdiction. Statutorily created triggers to jurisdiction and related standing rules may wittingly or 
unwittingly limit access to such boards and may do so in a way that is more limiting than the standing 
rules of the ordinary courts. That seems both anomalous and hard to justify. One would expect that the 
standing rules of specialized appeal tribunals should be at least as liberal as the ordinary courts for it 
would be truly anomalous if the result of creating a specialized tribunal was to make it more difficult 
to have the decisions-making practice of line department subject to review. Accordingly, we suggest 
that the relevant statutes should be amended to incorporate the concept of public interest standing as an 
alternative to the current directly affected test.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has discussed three different environmental statutes in order to assess whether there is a 
gap between their ambition and their actual implementation. Our review suggests that there are several 
inter-related factors that may get in the way of effective implementation. 
The first and generally well-understood factor is discretion. Statutes may be drafted in mandatory or 
discretionary terms; and within the area of executive discretion there is a broad spectrum of 
possibilities. The importance of discretion (and its absence) is well illustrated in our discussion of both 
ALSA and SARA. The ALSA discussion shows that the highly discretionary nature of that statute makes 
it exceptionally difficult to assess the extent to which that statute will ultimately achieve its lofty goals. 
Nobody doubts the ambition behind the policy documents that informed the development of ALSA but 
there is potentially a large gap between ambition and implementation. Furthermore, because the statute 
is framed in very discretionary terms, that gap can only be bridged at the political level; failure of the 
executive to act cannot be questioned in a court of law. Consequently, any failure in ALSA’s 
implementation will be a failure not of law but of politics. 
A different story emerges when we look at SARA. While there is some discretion in the SARA 
listing process, it is a constrained form. Furthermore, once a species is listed certain things follow 
inexorably. In this case the law, in the sense of “rule[s] of conduct or action…enforced by a 
controlling authority” [70], clearly does have a role to play—and in this case it is a positive one. As the 
SARA case law shows, law and core legal ideas such as the rule of law have proven to be instrumental 
in driving SARA’s implementation. In these cases, the mandatory language of the statute has allowed 
ENGOs to use the courts to obtain orders requiring the executive to fulfill its obligations under the 
Sustainability 2014, 6 6044 
 
statute by preparing recovery plans for listed species, identifying critical habitat and making the 
necessary orders to protect that habitat.  
A second and related factor is effective oversight. We have discussed three forms of oversight: 
political, which is the main form offered by ALSA but which also forms part of SARA’s constrained 
discretion schemes; judicial, which figures most prominently under SARA; and a specialized tribunal, 
the EAB. Each of these forms of oversight has different strengths and weakness. The experience with 
SARA’s listing process and its safety-net provisions (admittedly more tenuously) demonstrates that 
political oversight, which is to say democratic accountability, clearly has the potential to drive 
effective implementation, but the extent to which it will actually do so depends also on a complex set 
of extra-legal factors. A key strength of judicial oversight as exemplified by SARA is that it is both 
effective and mandatory, but it is also expensive, time-consuming and piece-meal, a reality illustrated 
by the increasingly uncertain fate of the Greater Sage Grouse. A key strength offered by the oversight 
of a specialized tribunal is the possibility of a more searching, purposive and substantive analysis of 
decision-making at the executive level.  
Several lessons emerge. Judicial (and tribunal) oversight is likely to work best when legislation is 
expressed in mandatory and non-discretionary terms. Such language provides the necessary 
benchmarks or legal tests against which executive action can be judged and lends itself most to a 
discussion framed in terms of the rule of law and the proposition that the executive branch can never 
act outside the law: be you ever so high the law is above you. The same general principle applies 
where judicial oversight is intended to play only a supporting role to political oversight, as in the case 
of SARA’s safety net provisions. Legislation that is framed in highly discretionary terms, such as 
ALSA, is less amenable to judicial oversight. In some cases, discretionary powers may be not only 
effectively non-justiciable but may be framed in such a manner that they also cannot be the subject of 
effective political oversight.  
Second, effective oversight, whether by the ordinary courts or by a specialized tribunal, depends upon 
access and standing. Access to justice requires access to requisite resources (important but beyond the 
scope of this paper); standing on the other hand is a distinctively legal concept. Although not discussed in 
any detail in this paper, the SARA case law makes plain that standing has not been a significant issue for 
ENGOs seeking to use the ordinary courts to enforce the mandatory obligations of SARA. By contrast, the 
discussion of Alberta’s EAB suggests that standing has been a significant obstacle to the effective use of 
that body. Finally, in what appears to be a relatively novel variation on the standing question, access to the 
ordinary courts may be filtered. In ALSA, the principal responsibility for ensuring implementation of the 
regional plans lies with the stewardship commissioner. This is problematic when combined with the highly 
discretionary powers associated with that office. 
Reflecting on the role of law in the success or failures of our three environmental regimes, we 
observe that law can only contribute to the achievement of the goals of modern environmental statutes 
to the extent that the legislature and executive permits. In this respect, each of the three environmental 
law statutes considered here tells a different story. ALSA reveals a story of an eco-system based and 
cumulative effects management regime, the implementation of which is left largely to the 
unconstrained discretion of the executive, without the oversight of an independent specialist tribunal or 
a true role for the courts. Meanwhile, SARA conveys a story of protective legislation, implemented by 
way of constrained political discretion, with the courts playing a supporting role in overseeing its 
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implementation. Finally, the EAB offers a story of a specialist tribunal empowered to foster a purposive 
interpretation of environmental legislation but hampered in its implementation by statutorily created 
triggers to jurisdiction and related standing rules which serve to limit access. In each of these stories, 
the environmental goals are ambitious, but the sub-plots reveal weaknesses that ultimately undermine 
their effective implementation. For this, the legislature and the executive are responsible—rather than 
the law itself. Finally, while these environmental statutes could be rewritten to use the legal tools 
available, until they are, the story from Canada is “mind the (implementation) gap”. 
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